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THE SCROLL AND THE SWORD: SYNERGIZING CIVIL-MILITARY POWER War and peace are part of the same policy continuum. All dimensions and elements of power count -at times some more than others, but in the end result, all. Long ago, Clausewitz described war as "…merely the continuation of policy by other means" (war not being the only way) and Liddell-Hart posited a century later that the "…object of war is to attain a better peace"
(going beyond war-fighting). 1 The War on Terrorism (now the "Long War"), however, provides an opportunity for broader and more substantive understanding of this insight. Applied national security strategy must now be at an unusual level of comprehensiveness, integration, and balance, from formulation through execution. Failure to realize this, at many decision-making levels, can cost many lives. It can also cost immense amounts of credibility and treasure, threatening to undermine U.S. grand strategy. More and more, national security and strategic thinkers are appreciating the need to leverage non-military elements of national power, represented in the interagency process and in the private sector. However, a unifying national concept, based on strategic principles for synergizing civil and military elements of power, has yet to find full articulation and translation into ways and means, encumbering America's ability to apply the full weight of civil and soft power to deal with strategic and ideological challenges asymmetric to hard power. This calls for a consciousness that transcends Sun Tzu's dictum that "…to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill".
Synergizing Civil and Military Power
America's need to learn to better synergize civil and military elements of power is evident in three areas -the emerging strategic environment, the prevailing American strategic culture, and recent interagency and military initiatives to close civil-military gaps.
First, the emerging strategic environment calls for a more holistic, far-reaching and balanced grand strategy. National security issues since the end of the Cold War and especially the 9/11 have been increasingly non-military. Challenges such as ethnic and religious conflict, terrorism and insurgencies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration, environmental instability, infectious diseases, and sharpening competition for dwindling natural resources are transforming hitherto orthodox notions of national security. Although nation-states retain the advantage of being able to coordinate and apply the full range of power elements, growing seams especially between nation-states present increasing vulnerabilities.
Within these seams, however, are not only the greatest threats to national security in the 21 st century, but also the greatest opportunities, among them international governmental and non-governmental and private sector organizations, which have proliferated in number, variety, and capability since the early 1990s. The United Nations and its agencies alone are far more capable at peace operations than in the early 1990s. A watershed development is the recently created U.S-inspired and supported Peace-Building Commission (PBC) as part of emerging UN reform. According to U.S. Ambassador to the UN John R. Bolton:
Our common imperative is to create a cost-effective, efficient advisory institution, capable of ensuring the successful transition from peacekeeping operations into peace building, providing important advice but not duplicating work. The PBC can most effectively help prevent nations from sliding back into conflict by ensuring that the Security Council is aware of all the elements that are essential to achieving sustainable peace in a given nation, from immediate humanitarian assistance to transitional security to national efforts at institution building. requires an organization vested with the power to coordinate political, social, economic, and military elements". 4 And "…because insurgency is a holistic threat, counterinsurgency must be integrated and holistic". 5 Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, however, transnational threats such as al-Qaeda are now understood as a "global insurgency" rather than simply as an international terrorist network. 6 At the same time, due to a flattening, non-linear world, decision cycles have shrunk while interdependent second-and third-order effects gain new importance, pressuring leadership to anticipate change and shape events rather than be shaped by them. The margins of error are becoming too narrow, the consequences and stakes too high, and the opportunities too great to keep doing the business of national security as usual.
Second, traditional American bias towards (coercive) "hard" power in general -and its unilateral, pre-emptive use of late -has been not without issue and cost. Beyond missed opportunities for effective application of all elements of national power (especially informational), it presents often counterproductive costs and risks. International and domestic support for U.S.
policies related to the War on Terrorism has been problematic, while America's international standing and moral authority has been tenuous, encumbering newly energized diplomatic and information strategies. In addition, the U.S. continues to shoulder immense political and financial costs, which it cannot afford indefinitely. War on Terrorism interventions have cost around $100-billion annually in mostly supplemental instruments for over five years, on top of programmed Defense outlays. In other words, America's more pre-emptive, hard-power approach since 9/11 has already cost nearly a half-trillion dollars (not including hundreds of billions spent so far on homeland defense or an even the larger direct and indirect costs directly resulting from 9/11.) Given mounting fiscal pressures and competing domestic constraints, there are signs this largesse cannot go on much longer.
The preference for hard power is heavily reflected fiscally, most obviously between the budgets of the Defense and State Departments (the former budget about 30 times the latter).
Even though the foreign aid budget has expanded substantially, it is still only around $18. Third, policy and program developments at interagency and joint levels reflect recognition of the need to more adroitly synchronize civil and military power. National security strategies are entailing a more holistic, balanced strategy involving greater use of civil and soft power. Of the eight "aims" of the National Security Strategy, four are soft-power intensive, three are a combination of soft and hard power, and one is primarily hard-power. 13 Of There is also growing attention to improving the interagency process. Significant to this are the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Beyond Goldwater-Nichols studies, which recommend the realization of an interagency concept of "unity of effort":
Complex U.S. contingency operations over the past decade, from Somalia to Iraq, have demonstrated the necessity for a unity of effort not only from the armed forces but also from across the U.S. government and an international coalition. In most cases, however, such unity of effort has proved elusive, sometimes with disastrous results. The U.S. national security apparatus requires significant new investments in this area. Otherwise, the United States' ability to conduct successful political-military contingency operations will continue to be fundamentally impaired. 17 Other than Homeland Security, State and Defense are most involved in the interagency national security process. Under the "transformational diplomacy" concept promulgated in January 2006, the State Department is empowering interagency cooperation:
Vital to this vision is continued collaboration between civilians and the military. Diplomats must be able to work effectively at the critical intersections of diplomatic affairs, economic reconstruction, and military operations.
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A month earlier, the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 44, the long-awaited replacement of the Clinton Administration's PDD-56. It designates DoS, as the lead agency for interagency coordination and planning, to develop strategies and plans for reconstruction and stabilization as well as a civilian response capability through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This is the first wholly interagency document of its kind. 19 Given its small budget and limited personnel, it will take S/CRS some time to organize, be fully staffed and resourced, and gain institutional traction and muscle.
DoD, in contrast, is further along, starting with the Secretary of Defense's observation, shortly after 9/11, that "…wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national power..." 20 The new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has similarly instructed:
We must harness the elements of national power to win the War on Terrorism… Through closer coordination within the Department of Defense and interagency we maximize the impact of our military power and build trust, synergy, and momentum. We will focus on a collaborative approach… building and enhancing interagency relationships. Look for ways that the military instrument -and the way it is applied -can complement and strengthen the actions of other elements of national power. 21 The latest Quadrennial Defense Review, in turn, recognizes the need for a formal strategic concept to synergize military and non-military power:
The QDR recommends the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. It would help Federal Departments and Agencies better align their strategy, budget and planning functions with national objectives. 22 DoD interagency coordination mechanisms are also more robust. Among them is DoD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction
Operations". Released a month before NSPD-44, it notes that "integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations". 23 In addition:
Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations…, U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations…, and private sector individuals and for-profit companies.
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DoDD 3000.05 supports DoD's "unified action" concept, which is "the synergistic application of all instruments of national power and multinational power and includes the action of non-military organizations as well as the military forces". 25 TSC, which features non-combat programs to build relationships and mitigate the need to resort to combat operations, is embedded in the Joint Operation Planning doctrine. 26 (However, there is no joint, interagency doctrine dedicated to TSC.) Then there is the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) concept of Effects-Based Operations (EBO), which expands the planning and conduct of operations from a predominantly force-oriented, military-on-military approach to one that facilitates the application of all elements of power. 27 The Army, which bears the brunt of missions in Phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority) of the joint planning process, also realizes that:
Both national and international security require integrating many nonmilitary disciplines, including such areas as economic and political health. To a greater degree than ever, diplomatic, informational, and economic factors now affect national security. At the strategic level, an adversary's power is no longer reckoned in terms of its military capabilities. It is now assessed more comprehensively, in terms of its interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems. …relate to civilian populations, culture, organizations, and leaders… in all operations directly or indirectly affecting civilian populations. At the operational level, civil considerations include the interaction between military operations and the other instruments of national power. Civil considerations at the tactical level generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on the current operation; however, they also consider larger, long term diplomatic, economic, and informational issues. 29 (Interestingly, while Army operational doctrine identifies seven "battle operating systems" with respect to METT-TC, none of them engages the "C" factor.)
For some time, therefore, the defense and military community will be, by default more than desire, the driver for interagency cooperation and coordination, in Washington and the field, and for the development of non-DoD managerial capabilities, recognized by a growing number in the Defense establishment. Among these efforts is DoD's support of the S/CRS, with a transfer of about $200-million and loan of staff to energize that effort. As a September 2005
Defense Science Board study on stability operations posited:
We have great respect for the military services' approach to management... We believe this management discipline, now focused on combat operations, must be extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to intelligence-not only in DoD, but across the government… In addition to strengthening capabilities within the Department of Defense, we urge the secretary to use his considerable influence to propel needed changes that span the government's agencies and departments… other than Defense.30 The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U. There are now three U.S. Marine civil affairs groups (CAGs, tactical CA formations slightly larger the Army CA battalions); furthermore, the USMC has tasked its artillery battalions with CMO as a secondary mission. The Navy (in addition to setting up a corps of foreign area officers, or FAOs, to go out with the fleets) is creating two Reserve civil affairs battalions from its
Reserve mobile construction (Seabee) battalions. 34 The Air Force has created some CMO capability to support its expeditionary concept, while both Air Force and Navy Reserve personnel are receiving CA/CMO training at Ft. Bragg, albeit to help the Army fill its depleted ranks of CA personnel to support continued deployments. 35 CA is the premier military specialty to facilitate CMO, and while capabilities are growing among other services, the bulk of CA still comes from the Army -land power remaining most suited to integrate all elements of national power, especially in post-conflict situations. Only the Army has strategic, operational, and tactical CA capability, with its CA commands and brigades as well as its battalions. Army CA has been doing this for generations, though its mission has evolved considerably since the Cold War.
Army CA, with historical roots in post-war Germany and Japan, are the designated Active CA is a thus a strategic enabler. Its potential as such is gaining visibility. Robert Kaplan notes that the U.S. Pacific Command, within the context of its TSC concept, conducts "civil affairs projects" to help secure basing rights and, conversely, deny them to potential adversaries such as China. 36 More specifically, in a piece on how the U.S. should pursue its global security interests, Kaplan lists as the first of 10 "rules" the need for more CA personnel. 37 In addition, most actionable intelligence nowadays is of the "human intelligence" variety, which originates from open sources and comes through information and cultural/situational awareness obtained from personal contacts and relationships through diplomacy, commercial activities, and CMO (and psychological operations, or PSYOP). CA/CMO thus have significant value as information sources for intelligence: "Timely and actionable intelligence, together with early warning, is the most critical enabler to protecting the United States at a safe distance." 38 Beyond early warning, CA/CMO can detect "opportunities for democratic transformation". 39 In nation assistance missions, CA can contribute to early warning in failing or trouble states, as a by-product of its presence and area assessments in cooperation with country teams.
Last but not least, CA has considerable impact on information operations (IO) and the "war of ideas", not only due to its "key leader engagement" of indigenous public opinion makers and international civilian relief and reconstruction managers at the tactical and operational centers of gravity, but through generation of "good news stories" on relief and reconstruction progress gained through its civil-military coordination and information management activities, thus feeding both strategic communications and IO efforts at the tactical, operational, strategic centers of gravity. 40 Moreover, the growing civil information management role of CA and its longstanding civil-military operations center (CMOC) and CMO estimate best practices can facilitate interagency unity of effort at all levels.
In all these respects, properly utilized strategically, CA and CMO can deal with strategic threats and opportunities at the generative stage in nation assistance or TSC missions, not just when the conflict or crisis breaks out, which is more risk-laden and expensive and where hard power becomes the Hobson's choice.
CA has been the most expedient and cost-effective means the military has to execute U.S. political-military strategy and win the peace on the ground. America's capability to conduct this increasingly vital mission is little more than 6,000 CA soldiers in the Army and Marines.
(About 96% are in the RC -itself in a dynamic state of transformation, mainly because they are best suited for intense interaction with civilians and because of civilian knowledge and skills they have or can access -and cannot be duplicated in the AC without great expense.) 41 Less than one half of one percent of the U.S. force structure is thus dedicated to leveraging non-military power and winning the peace -and the budget share is even smaller. In many ways, CA is the low-tech solution to the low-tech problem -perhaps why it gathers little attention in a strategic culture predisposed to hard power and vested in the military industrial complex.
As proof of its worth, since the early 1990s, demand for CA has escalated and then, CA is hard pressed to support both the burgeoning CMO mission and interagency nationbuilding. One reason, in truth, is because CA's traditional comparative advantages in particularly language and cultural knowledge, as well as its nation-building functional specialist proficiency, have dwindled over time for a number of reasons. Under-resourced and understaffed, USACAPOC has been addressing issues related to doctrine and force design, as it lobbied for assistance from higher commands. It may be too little, too late, as the chain of command (and advocacy) changes from special operations to the "Big Army". While intense discussion at the DoD, SOCOM, and Army levels ensued over whether CA should stay in SOF, more important issues of doctrine, force management and operational tempo, CA employment in theater, CA education and training, etc., received less attention. 42 As the Defense Science Board (which did not recommend moving CA out of SOF) noted in late 2005:
Perhaps, more important than organizational reporting is proper sizing, recruitment, retention and motivation of the best people to actually perform Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs is largely a reserve activity, and we think that is good insofar as it provides a window on the private sector where the skills required by the stability operations mission can be found in abundance. However, the reserve recruitment process for Civil Affairs is the overall reserve recruitment process and may not tap into the private sector communities with the special skills needed by Civil Affairs. Further issues regarding Civil Affairs involve how they are fielded, i.e. coupled to maneuver units, and whether that leads to the best use of the special capabilities of Civil Affairs units. We also need to consider the rotation policy for Civil Affairs reservists and the mobilization policy, and tailor same to the special needs for Civil Affairs. Finally, in light of the likely size of future stability operations, we have to consider whether the overall size of that reserve capability is adequate: quantity has a quality all its own. 43 Although the value-added of CMO and CA, as the military exemplar of strategic ways and means to synergize civil-military power is becoming more apparent, CA as a strategic capability may be on the verge of collapse. There is no single DoD executive agent for CA (and PYSOP).
It is currently split between the Army Reserve Command for RC force management and U.S.
Army Special Operations Command for AC force management and doctrine/schools. Beyond USACAPOC's efforts, the Army Reserve is looking at revitalizing CA functional specialty capabilities through better recruiting and retention policies, a warrant officer program for CA specialists, and Army-paid industry and public administration internships for them. 44 Another idea is for DoS, as it stands up S/CRS Advanced Civilian Teams, an Active Response Corps, and a Standby Ready Reserve -as counterpart to CA functional specialists, to look to DoD, especially the Army Corps of Engineers, for its initial capability in deploying civilians and developing its own expeditionary culture. 45 In any case, however, these civil-military capabilities issues must be addressed in a comprehensive context for synergizing civil-military power that applies to both communities.
A Context for Synergizing Civil-Military Power
A unifying national strategic context for synergizing civil and military elements of power can be found: first, in a hierarchy of strategic concepts; and second, in identifying strategic principles for CMO and CA -not only in order to understand how this synergy can take place horizontally across the elements of power represented in the interagency process, but perhaps most importantly, how it can be translated vertically from the strategic to the operational and tactical levels, for both civil and military components.
Elements of a strategic hierarchy of civil-military concepts already exist, albeit not developed and linked holistically -starting with interagency "unity of effort", the principles for which are being further developed. 46 (In truth, "unity of effort" may be too tall of an order, as understood by the military. More realistic, in most cases, may be "unity of purpose" -more agreement on basic goals and objectives than on common ways and means.) Cascading down the strategic scale, "unity of effort" (or purpose) could flow into the "unified action" systems framework articulated in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), the bridging document between national security and military strategies and joint doctrine. 47 Unified action aims to achieve unity of effort (or purpose) among all elements of power in order to engage effect that you want is sustainable peace, you need that full spectrum of capabilities and where you're going to get that, the majority of those capabilities, is from the civilian world. 49 These lines of e ffort may also be understood within a broader conceptual relationship between modes of policy and force in a continuous loop. Policy may give way for a moment to a mode of force (in conflict) but policy prevails. Evoking Clausewitz as such can serve to "remind leaders that force is not an end in itself." 50 Within the U.S. Government, there will need to be a change in the culture of cabinet departments, other than DoD, which are largely focused on policy… The nature of the inter-agency process has to change to be more than coordination; to be an orchestration of all the instruments of U.S. power. Where there is separation of statutory authorities from capabilities and resources, we will need to reconcile those differences without undue acrimony.
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It also begins with transforming interagency civil and military cultures into learning organizations, separately and together, through the education and training of leaders and in policies for professional development and career management that reward experience in civilmilitary and interagency coordination. 55 An interdisciplinary, civil-military training and educational center of excellence program, for example, would not only offer economy of scale to draw the participation of important but less capital-rich players (e.g., NGOs), it would help bridge the vertical gaps between policy and implementation simultaneously with the horizontal gaps of interdisciplinary and international cooperation and coordination. 56 Specifically in the military:
Future professional development should incorporate knowledge areas such as police actions, foreign internal defense and interagency/joint/coalition operations. Skill sets or competencies must include cultural awareness, civil-military operations, intelligence, and information operations. 57 Because of its still-predominant role in international interventions, the military -more than any other organizational culture -must inculcate, from the ground up and the top down, a new consciousness of civil-military power, in order to win the peace and the "war of ideas" as well as mitigate strategic cost and risk. War-winning must take precedence over war-fighting, opportunities over threats, capabilities over forces, and the military as an enabling and not just implementing source of power. While the scroll is indeed mightier than the sword, both are mightiest in unison. This synergy, more than anything else, will help ensure that America and its allies will chart their own destinies more than become orphans of the storm. 
